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BUFFALO LAW REVIEI

AGENCY
Vicarious Liabililfy-impufed Negligence
In Sims v. Bergamo,' the Court was concerned with the application of the
scope of employment standard in a vicarious liability situation. The plaintiff, a
patron in defendant's bar and grill, became involved in a disagreement with the
latter's bartender. After an hour's abse ice, she was invited to return to the bar
by the bartender who thereupon assaulted her. The jury found fo: the plaintiff
but the Appellate Division dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals,
while recognizing that there was little evidence to show a connection between the
bartender's action and his employer's business, followed the settled rule that the
evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on review of
was sufficient evidence from which
a dismissal and accordingly held that there
2
the jury could have found for the plaintiff.
The primary consideration in determining the defendant's liability in this
case was whether the servant was acting in the furtherance of his employer's
interests and therefore within the scope of his employment or whether he was
merely on an independent excursion at the time of the assault. The dissent
differed with the majority as to the probable weight of the evidence presented, it
being their contention that the evidence could not, as a matter of law, sustain a
finding that the servant was acting in the furtherance of his employer's interests,
The concept of vicarious liability and its qualifying standard of scope of
employment are somewhat subtle in their application. Various rules and theories
have been devised by the courts in an effort to rationalize and at the same time
restrict these concepts to the bounds of justice and equity. One such theory is the
business cost or "deep pocket" theory which, while seldom expressed, has served
to influence a great many prior decisions and very likely the decision in the
instant case. The justification for this theory is that a defendant employer will
be best able to bear the cost of tort judgments and thus almost insure recovery
4
for injured plaintiffs.
Vicarious Liabil.ify-Accident Outside State
In Selles v. Smith,' plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he
was a passenger overturned as it was speeding through South Carolina. Plaintiff
1. 3 N.Y.2d 531, 169 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1957).
2. De Wald v. Seidenberg, 297 N.Y. 355, 79 N.E.2d 430 (1948).
3. Bluestein v. Scoparino, 277 App. Div. 534, 100 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1st Dep't
1950).
4. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J.
584 and 720 (1928).
5. 4 N.Y.2d 412, 176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958).
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brought an action claiming negligence on the part of his wife who was driving. The
defendant, who was the owner of the vehicle, was also a passenger at the time of
the accident. The plaintiff recovered a verdict which was reversed on the law in
the Appellate Division. That court held the defendant was not liable for the
driver's negligent operation since there was no proof the driver was an agent of

the owner or of a master-servant relationship. 6
The Court held that since the accident occurred in South Carolina,
the law of that jurisdiction is controlling. Absent a showing of the law
of that state, however, it is presumed to be the same as the common law of
New York. The Court held that, under the common law of New York, developed
prior to the enactment of §59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, there was sufficient
evidence presented to raise a question of defendant's liability. Therefore, it was
error for the Appellate Division to reverse the judgment of the Trial Term and
dismiss the complaint. In a normal case, such verdict as was rendered for the
plaintiff would be reinstated. However, since the Court found error in the
instructions presented to the jury, a new trial was required.
The instruction to the jury was erroneous in that it was to the effect that in
order to hold defendant liable for the driver's negligence, it must appear only
that she was operating the vehicle with his consent; more than mere consent is
required to make defendant liable.
Under the New York common law the owner is not liable for the driver's
negligence if the accident occurs while the vehicle is being used for the business
or pleasure of the borrower. 7 However, liability will attach if the car is being
operated at the owner's express or implied request for his benefit and under his
direction. No strict relationship of master-servant need be present, and compensation need not be paid to the driver by the owner.8 Thus, while no liability
will adhere to the owner if the borrower has taken the car for his own use, if
there is some requested benefit which accrues to the owner from the operation
of the vehicle, and the driver is directed as to route, operation or destination in
some manner, it will be enough to form a basis for defendant's liability for any
ensuing negligence. The Court pointed out that these requisite elements could be
more readily found in the present case in view of the fact that defendant was
present in the car and had the right to direct its operation. It held that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the operation was at his request
and for his benefit. "It was respondent's car, he was present and had the legal
right to control its operation, and the negligent conduct of the driver was
imputable to him."9
6.
7.
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5 A.D.2d 617, 168 N.Y.S.2d 363 (2d Dep't 1957).
Goche v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
NaIli v. Peters, 241 N.Y. 177, 149 N.E. 343 (1925).
Supra, note 3 at 346, 178 N.E. at 554.

